Nigeria Federalism and counterproductive effect: Mediating the role of confederal state

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria federalisms a subject of debate in the public domain. There is increasing concern that undermines significance and robust value of federal system of government in the Nigeria context. It is notable universal knowledge that federalism is prototype of national development and economic growth for some countries like the United States of America. Despite evidence of positive outcome in federal states, Nigeria case is bedeviled with strives and unhealthy rivalry. There is increasing dilapidation of ethnic distrust which is hampering unity of Nigeria especially the anxiety of the south-south and south-east peoples. The problem has been exacerbated in the government of President Muhammadu Buhari. Against this backdrop, this study appraised pattern of agitation in the Nigeria federal system. The study adopted survey design which consisted of qualitative and quantitative method. Sample size was 1320 and this was applied for quantitative survey, while qualitative survey was conducted among small size groups. Data were collected and analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively. The former applied structured questionnaire, descriptive and inferential statistics. The latter applied unstructured interview and thematic analysis. More than three quarter, 735 participants disagreed that federal government enshrined national unity in the structure of federal appointments. Chi square estimate,x^2 89.8; $p<0.01$, was significant measuring pattern of federal appointments and ethnic agitations. Qualitative data reveals, Indigenous peoples of the southern Nigeria identified skewed pattern of federal appointments in key military hierarchy and mainstream oil corporation which excluded their ethnic members. This is the major cause of agitation. This study recommends renegotiation of oil derivation benefits, restructuring of appointment in key oil corporation which justifies consent of the host communities of mineral resources.

Keywords: Renegotiation of federalism, resource control, ethnic groups, federal character

Introduction

Nigeria is federal state and operated republican constitution which defines the role of state. The history of Nigeria is synonymous with federation government. This draws from the fact that there is unique pattern of state function and units therein. The federal government of Nigeria has long history of statehood and governance in the post independent period (Onanuga, 2014). The post 1966 military coup was precursor to established federalism which began in 1979. Since this period, Nigeria has witnessed incessant ethnic strife. Notably, federalism imposes power of sovereign federal state on federating units. There is absolute power of federal government and such granted same to president or Head of state to wield power of absolute (Nweke, 2019). The 1979 constitution and 1999 revised edition as amended provides for presidential system in the federal state (Fadakinte, 2013). Historically, the agitation since 1979 is vehemently centred around resource control. This is so because the 1999 constitution provided sections for power of the federal government and federating states in the exclusive list, concurrent list and residual list (The 1999 Constitution Document, 2015). The constitution clearly stated that federal government shall legislateon exclusive list and concurrent list. Whereas provision of exclusive list takes away resource control from states or regions it is found, federal government is empowered by the constitution through its organs to determine what is retained as royalties or derivation by regions which host the resources. This means the federating units are reduced to powerless control on the resources which were earlier used to develop regions that host the mineral resources in pre federalism. During regional government, the Western, Eastern and Northern region developed at

peace with regional resources and only pay tax to central government. Nigeria was not engulfed in the orgy of devastating outlook before the 1966 military coup. The absolute power of federal state in Nigeria multi ethnic society has been the recipe for current disparaging tension, agitations and severe ethnic distrust (Etekpe, 2007).There has been numerous freedom fighter organisations, especially dominant in the southern Nigeria.

The agitations of freedom fighters is conveniently located around sense of inequality and powerless outlook of resource control which hampers regional development, creates hunger, unemployment, poor policing and security which questions collective existence (Falana, 2018). It is argued by some scholars that federalism hampers pace of growth for federating units, breeds over dependent on the centre, creates lazy states and unhealthy rivalry and ethnic suspicions (Ake,2001;Akinboye,2001). The groundbreaking contradiction is the ethnic unrest which federalism triggers. This occurs in the creation of ethnic militia and organised pressure groups which impose unpopular standard to derail federal state. There is uprising of militia groups on the one hand, there is formation of elite group on the other hand. Federalism creates pattern of agitation subtle to metamorphose and snowball into large scale conflict and civil unrest in a multi ethnic state. Nigeria has repeatedly witnessed this unrest and uprising in the government of President Muhammadu Buhari. There is public disenchantment and disillusionment against Buhari government by peoples of the east and south due to state nepotism and discrimination which exclude the ethnic people in federal structure of appointment, project development and military bureaucracy (Falana, 2018). Unfortunately, the situation in the south-east and south-south has deteriorated due to expression of anger against the federal government. Yet, this region contributed in quantum measure to Nigeria mainstay economy. Against this backdrop, this paper is drafted to:

i. Assess pattern of agitation in the Nigerian federalism among peoples of southern geopolitical zones.

Literature Review

It is curious to know that federalism is a collective agreement in a social contractin which federating units have agreed to give up their self independent rule. Notably, Nigerian federalism occurs in a multi ethnic landscape which brings together competitive groups. There is conscious agreement which laid bare compensation by amount of contribution to national sovereign pulse and redistribution of benefits. This accounts for federal allocation and fiscal commission in Nigeria saddled withsuch responsibility. It follows that suspicions around unbalanced and skewed agreement create recipe for agitation in the federal state.

Modeling Agreement

Social contract theories fundamentally differ in whether the parties reason differently or the same. As is placed in Rawls's contract everyone reasons the same: the collective choice problem is reduced to the choice of one individual. Any one person's decision is a proxy for everyone else. In social contracts of this sort, the description of the parties (their motivation, the conditions under which they choose) does all the work: once we have fully specified the reasoning of one party, the contract has been identified. The alternative view is that, even after we have specified the parties (including their rationality, values and information), they continue to disagree in their rankings of possible social contracts. On this view, the contract only has a determinate result if there is some way to commensurate the different rankings of each individual to yield an agreement (D'Agostino, 2003). This paper draws on two key models of agreement mechanisms.

Consent:

The traditional social contract views of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau crucially relied on the idea of consent. For Locke only "consent of Free-men" could make them members of government (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). According to these theorists and later discourse, the idea of consent implies a normative power to bind oneself. When one reaches the age of consent one is empowered to make certain sorts of binding agreements, contracts. By putting consent at the centre of their contracts these early modern contract theorists submitted that individuals had basic normative powers over themselves, self-ownership before they entered into the social contract

and brought the question of political obligation to the fore. If the parties have the power to bind themselves by exercising this normative power, then the upshot of the social contract was obligation. As Hobbes insisted, covenants bind; that is why they are "artificial chains" (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Both of these considerations have come under attack in contemporary social contract theories, especially the second. According to Buchanan (2000), the key development of recent social contract theory has been to distinguish the question of what generates political obligation (the key concern of the consent tradition in social contract thought) from the question of what constitutional orders or social institutions are mutually beneficial and stable over time. The nature of a person's duty to abide by the law or social rules is a matter of a morality as it pertains to individuals (Rawls 1999), while the design and justification of political and social institutions is a question of public or social morality.

On Buchanan's view, a crucial feature of more recent contractual thought has been to refocus political philosophy on public or social morality rather than individual obligation. Although contemporary social contract theorists still sometimes employ the language of consent, the core idea of contemporary social contract theory is agreement. Social contract views work from the intuitive idea of agreement (Freeman 2007a). One can endorse or agree to a principle without that act of endorsement in any way binding one to obey. Social contract theorist as diverse as Freeman sees the act of agreement as indicating what reasons we have. Agreement is a test or a heuristic. The role of unanimous collective agreement is in showing what we have reasons to do in our social and political relations (Freeman 2006). The agreement is not itself a binding act, it is not a performative that somehow creates obligation but is reason-revealing (Freeman, 2006). If individuals are rational, what they agree to reflects is the reasons they have. In contemporary contract theories such as Rawls', the problem of justification takes center stage. Rawls' revival of social contract theory in A Theory of Justice thus did not base obligations on consent, though the apparatus of an original agreement persisted. For Rawls (1999) the aim is to settle the question of justification, by working out a problem of deliberation. Given that the problem of justification has taken center stage, the second aspect of contemporary social contract thinking appears to fall into place: its reliance on models of hypothetical agreement. The aim is to model the reasons of citizens, and so we ask what they would agree to under conditions in which their agreements would be expected to track their reasons. Contemporary contract theory is, characteristically, doubly hypothetical. Certainly, no prominent theorist thinks that questions of justification are settled by an actual survey of attitudes towards existing social arrangements, and are not settled until such a survey has been carried out. The question, then, is not, are these arrangements presently the object of an actual agreement among citizens? If this were the question, the answer would typically be No. The question, rather is, would these arrangements be the object of an agreement if citizens were surveyed (Freeman 2007a) like the case in Nigeria social contract?

Although both of the questions are, in some sense, susceptible to an empirical reading, only the latter is in play in present-day theorizing. The contract in the present is always hypothetical in at least this first sense. There is a reading of the (first-order) hypothetical question "would the arrangements be the object of agreement if… which, as indicated, is still resolutely empirical in some sense. This is the reading where what is required of the theorist is that it try to determine what an actual survey of actual citizens would reveal about their actual attitudes towards their system of social arrangements. But there is another interpretation that is more widely accepted in the contemporary context. On this reading, the question is no longer a hypothetical question about actual reactions; it is, rather, a hypothetical question about hypothetical reactions, it is, doubly hypothetical. Framing the question is the first hypothetical element: would it be the object of agreement if they were surveyed? Framed by this question is the second hypothetical element, one which involves the citizens, who are no longer treated empirically, taken as given, but are, instead, themselves considered from a hypothetical point of view, as they would be if (typically) they were better informed or more impartial. The question for most contemporary contract theorists is, if we surveyed the idealized surrogates of the actual citizens in this polity, what social arrangements would be the object of an agreement among them? Famously, Ronald Dworkin has objected that a doubly hypothetical agreement cannot bind any actual person. For the hypothetical analysis to make sense, it must be shown that hypothetical persons in the

contract can agree to be bound by some principle regulating social arrangements (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017).

Suppose that it could be shown that your surrogate (a better informed, more impartial version of you) would agree to a principle. What has that to do with you? Where this second stage hypothetical analysis is employed, it seems to be proposed that you can be bound by agreements that others, different from you, would have made. While it might (though it needn't) be reasonable to suppose that you can be bound by agreements that you would yourself have entered into if given the opportunity, it seems crazy to think that you can be bound by agreements that, demonstrably, you wouldn't have made even if you had been asked. This is applicable to the 1999 constitution made under military regime and supposedly binding on the agreement of people in the civil democracy. This criticism is decisive, however, only if the hypothetical social contract is supposed to invoke your normative power to self-bind via consent. That your surrogate employs her power to self-bind would not mean that you had employed your power. Again, though, the power to obligate oneself is not typically invoked in the contemporary social contract: the problem of deliberation is supposed to help us make headway on the problem of justification. So the question for contemporary hypothetical contract theories is whether the hypothetical agreement of your surrogate tracks your reasons to accept social arrangements, a very different issue.

It is almost a commonplace today that contemporary social contract theory relies on hypothetical, not actual, agreement. As we have seen, in one sense this is certainly the case. However, in many ways the "hypothetical/actual" divide is artificial; the hypothetical agreement is meant to model, and provide the basis for actual agreement. Understanding contemporary social contract theory is best achieved, not through insisting on the distinction between actual and hypothetical contracts, but by grasping the interplay of the hypothetical and the actual.

Thekey here is Rawls's (1996) distinction among the perspectives of: you and me; the parties to the deliberative model; and persons in a well-ordered society. The agreement of the parties in the deliberative model is certainly hypothetical in the two-fold sense that is analyzed: a hypothetical agreement among hypothetical parties. But the point of the deliberative model is to help ("you and me") solve our justificatory problem, what social arrangements we can all accept as free persons who have no authority over one another (Rawls, 1996). Really, the amalgamation of Nigeria is a precedent of hypothetical justificatory. It is an assumption that there shall be one Nigeria formed by multi ethnic units and shall cohabit together in equity and equality. This justificatory hypothesis is the justice for all which triggered the consent of parties to agree. The parties' deliberations and the conditions under which they deliberate, then, model our actual convictions about justice and justification. As Rawls (1999) says, the reasoning of the hypothetical parties matters to us because the conditions embodied in the description of this situation are ones that we do in fact accept. Unless the hypothetical models the actual, the upshot of the hypothetical could not provide us with reasons. Gaus (2011a) describes something like this process as a testing conception of the social contract. We use the hypothetical deliberative device of the contract to test our social institutions. In this way, the contemporary social contract is meant to be a model of the justificatory situation that all individuals face. The hypothetical and abstracted nature of the contract is needed to highlight the relevant features of the parties to show what reasons they have. Freeman (2007) stressed the way in which focusing on the third perspective of citizens in a well ordered society shows the importance of actual agreement in Rawls's contract theory.

On Freeman's interpretation, the social contract must meet the condition of publicity. He writes: Rawls distinguishes three levels of publicity: first, the publicity of principles of justice; second, the publicity of the general beliefs in light of which first principles of justice can be accepted (that is, the theory of human nature and of social institutions generally); and, third, the publicity of the complete justification of the public conception of justice as it would be on its own terms. All three levels, Rawls contends, are exemplified in a well-ordered society, which now becomes suspicious in the case of Nigeria social contact. This is the "full publicity" condition. A justified contract must meet the full publicity condition: its complete justification must be capable of being actually accepted by members of a well-ordered society. The hypothetical agreement itself provides only what Rawls (1996) calls a "pro

tanto" or "so far as it goes" justification of the principles of justice. "Full justification" is achieved only when actual "people endorse and will liberal justice for the particular (and often conflicting) reasons implicit in the reasonable comprehensive doctrines they hold" (Freeman 2007b). Rawls's concern with the stability of justice as fairness, which motivated the move to political liberalism, is itself a question of justification. Only if the principles of justice are stable in this way are they fully justified. Rawls's concern with stability and publicity is not, however, idiosyncratic and is shared by all contemporary contract theorists. It is significant that even theorists such as Buchanan (2000), Gauthier (1986), and Binmore (2005) who are so different from Rawls in other respects share his concern with stability.

Bargaining

It is perhaps no surprise that the renaissance in contemporary contract theory occurred at the same time as game-theoretic tools and especially bargaining theory began to be applied to philosophical problems. Bargaining theory, as it was developed by Nash (1950) and Harsanyi (1997) is a rigorous approach to modeling how rational individuals would agree to divide some good or surplus. In its most general form, the bargaining model of agreement specifies some set of individuals who have individual utility functions that can be represented in relation to one other without requiring interpersonal comparisons of utility directly. Some good or goods for division is specified and if the individuals involved can agree on how to divide the good in question, they will get that division. If, however, they cannot agree they will instead get their disagreement result, the case in Nigeria as example. This may be what they brought to the table or it could be some other specified amount. One example is a simple demand game where two people must write down how much of given pot of money they want. If the two "bids" amount to equal or less than the pot; each will get what he or she wrote down, otherwise each will get nothing. As Rawls recognized in his 1958 essay "Justice as Fairness" one way for parties to resolve their disagreements is to employ bargaining solutions, such as that proposed by Braithwaite (1955). Rawls himself rejected bargaining solutions to the social contract since, in his opinion, such solutions rely on threat advantage and "to each according to his threat advantage is hardly a principle of fairness" (Rawls 1999). Gauthier, however, famously pursued this approach, building his Morals by Agreement on the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Gaus, 2016).

Binmore (2005) has recently advanced a version of social contract theory that relies on the Nash bargaining solution, as does Muldoon (2017) while Moehler (2014) relies on a "stabilized" Nash bargaining solution. Gauthier has since adopted a less formal approach to bargaining that is, nevertheless, still closer to his original solution than to the Nash Solution. In addition to Rawls's concern about threat advantage, a drawback of all such approaches is the multiplicity of bargaining solutions, which can significantly differ. Although the Nash solution is most favoured today, it can have counter-intuitive implications. Furthermore, there are many who argue that bargaining solutions are inherently indeterminate and so the only way to achieve determinacy is to introduce unrealistic or controversial assumptions (Southwood, 2010,2013). Similar problems also exist for equilibrium selection in games (Vanderschraaf, 2005; Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Many of the recent developments in bargaining theory and the social contract have adopted dynamic (Muldoon, 2017) or even evolutionary approaches to modeling bargaining (Alexander &Skyrms 1999, Skyrms, 2014).

This highlights a general divide in bargaining models between what we can call axiomatic and process models. The traditional, axiomatic, approach to the bargaining problem going back to John Nash, codified by John Harsanyi, and popularized by R. Duncan LuceandRaiffain 1957. Out of this tradition emerge several core bargaining solutions. Each uses a slightly different set of axioms to generate a unique and generally applicable way to divide a surplus. These include, most notably, the egalitarian (Raiffa 1953), the Nash (1950), the stabilized Nash (Moehler 2015), the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), and Gauthier's (1986,2013) minimax relative concession.

The main point of contention among these theories is whether to employ Nash's independence axiom or to use a monotonicity axiom (as the egalitarian, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and minimax relative concession do), although to one degree or another all of the axioms have been contested. For instance, one key axiom that all bargaining theories employ is a symmetry axiom. This axiom states that bargainers in the situation will reason the same, that is, I will

not be willing to give or take more than you in the same situation. This axiom seems reasonable, but it does not follow that the denial of symmetry is somehow a denial of reason. Indeed, Schelling (2009) was an early critic of the symmetry assumption in bargaining theory and more recently, Thrasher (2014a) has argued that the symmetry assumption is inconsistent with the traditional model of the social contract. Symmetry is necessary to generate a unique solution to the bargaining problem, however. It is uncertain in the mean-time how the symmetry bargaining could be adapted to model equity in the Nigeria social contract. A rejection of symmetry will likely entail a rejection of uniqueness, at least in axiomatic bargaining theory. The other approach to bargaining models of agreement is what can be called a process model. Instead of using various axioms to generate a uniquely rational solution, these theorists rely on some procedure that will generate a determinate, though not always unique result.

Process approaches use some mechanism to generate agreement. An example is an auction. There are many types of auctions (for example, English, Dutch, Vickrey and so on), each has a way of generating bids on some good and then deciding on a price. Posted price selling, like one often seen in consumer markets is also a kind of bargain, though an extremely asymmetric one where the seller has offered a "take or leave it" ask (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Double-auctions are more symmetrical and have a clearer link to the initial bargaining model. Although auctions are not typically used to solve pure division problems, there are some examples of auction mechanisms being used to solve public goods problems in interesting ways that guarantee unanimity (Smith 1977; Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Dworkin also uses a kind of auction mechanism in his work on equality, though he doesn't develop his approach for more general application (Heath 2004). Despite its promise, however, auction theory and its potential application to social contract theory has largely gone unexploited. The main process approach to bargaining derives from the influential work of Rubinstein (1982) and his proof that it is possible to show that an alternating offer bargaining process will generate the same result as Nash's axiomatic solution in certain cases. This result added life to Nash's (1950) early observation that bargaining and the rules of bargaining must be the result of some non-cooperative game with the idea being that it might be possible to unify bargaining theory and game theory. This approach, called the Nash Program, is championed most notably by Binmore (1998), whose evolutionary approach to the social contract relies on biological evolution (the game of life) to generate the background conditions of bargaining (the game of morals). Both can be modeled as non-cooperative games and the later can be modeled as a bargaining problem. By using this approach, Binmore (1998, 2005) claims to be able to show, in a robust and non-question-begging way, that something very much like Rawls's "justice as fairness" will be the result of this evolutionary bargaining process.

A more empirically minded approach follows Schelling's (1960) early work on bargaining and game theory by looking at the way actual people bargain and reach agreement. The pioneers of experimental economics used laboratory experiments to look at how subjects behaved in division problems (Smith 2003). Some of the most interesting results came, perhaps surprisingly, from asymmetric bargaining games like the ultimatum game (Smith 1982). Since these early experiments, considerable experimental work has been done on bargaining problems and cooperative agreement in economics. Much of the most philosophically relevant work involves the importance of social norms and conventions in determining the result (Bicchieri 2016). Although appealing to a bargaining solution can give determinacy to a social contract, it does so at the cost of appealing to a controversial commensuration mechanism in the case of axiomatic bargaining or of moving to process approaches that must ultimately rely on the empirically contingent outcome of social and biological evolution. Although the importance of bargaining in the social contract has been moribund for some time, recent work is changing that (Alexander 2007; Thrasher 2014a; Thoma, 2015; Muldoon 2017).

The Object of Agreement

Social contract theories differ about the object of the contract. In the traditional contract theories of Hobbes and Locke, the contract was about the terms of political association. In particular, the problem was the grounds and limits of citizen's obligation to obey the state. In his early formulation, Rawls' parties deliberated about "common practices" (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). In his later statement of his view, Rawls took the object of

agreement to be principles of justice to regulate "the basic structure:" The basic structure is understood as the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the legally enforced forms of property, and the organization of the economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure (Rawls, 1996). For Rawls, as for most contemporary contract theorists, the object of agreement is not, at least directly, the grounds of political obligation, but the principles of justice that regulate the basic institutions of society. Freeman (2007), perhaps the preeminent student of Rawls, focuses on "the social role of norms in public life." Buchanan (2000) is concerned with justifying constitutional orders of social and political institutions. Gauthier (1986), Scanlon (1998), Darwall (2006), Southwood (2010), and Gaus (2011a) employ the contract device to justify social moral claims. The level at which the object of the contract is described is apt to affect the outcome of the agreement. "A striking feature of Hobbes' view," Hardin (2003) points out, "is that it is a relative assessment of whole states of affairs; life in one form of government versus life under anarchy".

Hobbes could plausibly argue that everyone would agree to the social contract because "life under government" is, from the perspective of everyone, better than "life under anarchy" (the baseline condition). However, if a Hobbesian sought to divide the contract up into, more fine grained agreements about the various functions of government; it is apt to find that agreement would not be forthcoming on many functions. As in the case of fine-grained functions of government, the contract is apt to become more limited. If the parties are simply considering whether government is better than anarchy, they will opt for just about any government (including, one that funds the arts); if they are considering whether to have a government that funds the arts or one that doesn't, it is easy to see how they may not agree on the former. In a similar way, if the parties are deliberating about entire moral codes, there may be wide agreement that all moral codes, overall, are in everyone's interests. In multi-level contract theories such as Buchanan's (2000) each stage has its own unique object. In Buchanan's theory, the object of the constitutional stage is a system of constraints that will allow individuals to peacefully co-exist, what Buchanan calls the "protective state". On his view, the state of nature is characterized by both predation and defense. One's ability to engage in productive enterprises is decreased because of the need to defend the fruits of those enterprises against those who would rely on predation rather than production. We all have reason to contract, according to Buchanan, in order to increase the overall ability of everyone to produce by limiting the need for defense by constraining the ability to engage in predation. Once the solution to the predation-production conflict has been solved by the constitutional contract, members of society also realize that if all contributed to the production of various public goods, the productive possibility of society would be similarly increased.

This second, post-constitutional stage, involves what Buchanan calls the "productive state." Each stage is logically distinct though there are causal relationships between changes made at one stage and the efficacy and stability of the solution at the later stage. The distinction between the two stages is analogous to the traditional distinction between commutative and distributive justice. Although these two are often bound up together in contemporary contract theory, one of Buchanan's novel contributions is to suggest that there are theoretical gains to separating these distinct objects of agreement. Moehler's (2017) "multi-level" contract has several aspects. First, drawing on their pluralistic moral commitments, individuals seek to agree on social-moral rules that all can endorse as a common morality. The object of this agreement is similar to that of Darwall's, Gaus's and South wood's models. The second-level agreement is appropriate to circumstances in which pluralism is so deep and wide no common morality can be forged. Rather than moral agents, the parties are reconceived as instrumentally rational prudential agents: the object of this second level is rules of cooperation that advance the interests of all when a deeper moral basis cannot be uncovered. The interest of this study therefore is to show the implications of object of social contract, collective agreement and the components thereof (bargaining, consent, aggregation and equilibrium) in the Nigeria state especially now that the rife of renegotiation has become prominent calls by some segments of the contract.

Methodology

This paper is an empirical adventure undertaken by the researcher to investigate some of the factors associated with perceived tension among the peoples of southern Nigeria. The paper adopted survey method using descriptive research and cross sectional design. Sample size was 1320 participants discretely selected purposively. At the level of quantitative survey, target study population consisted of resident individuals who lived in some selected states of the south-east and south-south Nigeria. The researcher purposively identified Imo state, Abia state and Anambra state in the south-east; and Rivers state, Delta state and Bayelsa state in the south-south. These states were major hotspots zones of ethnic agitation and restructuring. At the level of qualitative survey, groups such as IPOB/MASSOB, OHANESE INDIGBO, PANDEF, House of Assembly and High Courts were identified for study. Similarly, the researcher adopted purposive sampling and accidental technique as sampling procedure. Using purposive method, the researcher justified inclusion of research objects, location and participants for the study. Accidental sampling was applied to select respondents for the study. These were individuals readily available and willing consented to participate in the study. Research instruments of data collection consisted of structured questionnaire and unstructured interview. The former was applied on resident individuals and the latter was applied among group discussants. Method of data collection was quantitatively and qualitatively derived using statistical label and text of conversation. Data were analysed using quantitative and qualitative method. The former applied descriptive and inferential statistics, the latter applied ethnographic model using thematic analysis. The researcher applied on consent of participants prior to data collection and kept anonymity of identity thereof.

Results and Discussion

Pattern of Agitation in Nigeria State

The pronouncement of the fourth republic constitution in 1999 that ushered the current dispensation of democratic government was an expectation that should bring together all ethnic compositions in Nigeria. Chapter three of the constitution recognized inalienable rights of all citizens without boundary of ethnic superiority or degradation. This same chapter of the constitution pronounced that there shall be no part of the country excluded to benefit in same proportion as other units. Explicitly, the 1999 constitution in section one provides for balanced growth and recognition for all ethnic groups. However, the current in the present Nigeria reveals disaffection and suspicions. Against this backdrop, this sub section, Table 1 and Table 1.2, discusses pattern of agitation which has lingered in the present configuration of the sovereign state.

Table 1: Respondents' Classification of Pattern of Agitation

Variables	South-East		South- South		Total	
	Freq= 642	Percent =100%	Freq= 678	Percent =100%	Fre= 1320	Percent =100%
What do you consider major agitation of your ethnic group?						
Federal appointment	102	15.9	108	15.9	210	15.9
Federal project	13	2.0	13	1.9	26	2.0
Content of constitution	36	5.6	42	6.2	78	5.9
Marginalization	48	7.5	47	6.9	95	7.2
Resource control	443	69.0	455	67.1	911	69.0
The agitation is collective struggle by members of your ethnic						

Disagreed	36	5.6	42	6.2	78	5.9
Moderately agreed	210	32.7	217	32.0	427	32.3
Strongly agreed	396	61.7	419	61.8	815	61.8
What do you consider as major problem with the constitution?						
Structure of constitution	232	36.1	253	37.3	485	36.7
Powers of the president	40	6.2	39	5.8	79	6.0
Resource control	285	44.4	289	42.6	574	43.5
Formulation of the constitution	85	13.2	97	14.3	182	13.8
The current presidential system deprives your ethnic group						
Disagreed	65	10.1	67	9.9	132	10.0
Moderately agreed	139	21.7	148	21.8	287	21.7
Strongly agreed	438	68.2	463	68.3	901	68.3
Federal project(s) in your geo political zone is sustainable						
Disagreed	379	59.0	392	57.8	771	58.4
Moderately agreed	153	23.8	162	23.9	315	23.9
Strongly agreed	110	17.1	124	18.3	234	17.7
Federal projects &infrastructures in your geopolitical zone promote sense of belonging						
Disagreed						
Moderately agreed	381	59.3	410	60.5	791	59.9
Strongly agreed	197	30.7	200	29.5	397	30.1
	64	10.0	68	10.0	132	10.0
What forms of marginalization your geopolitical zone has experienced in Nigeria?						
Political marginalization						
Economic marginalization	82	12.8	89	13.1	171	13.0
Local government creation	92	14.3	103	15.2	195	14.8
Appointments Military hierarchies	18	2.8	21	3.1	39	3.0
	450	70.1	465	68.6	915	69.2
Marginalization of your geopolitical zone has triggered conflict						
Strongly agreed	239	37.2	257	37.9	496	37.5
Moderately agreed	165	25.7	175	25.8	340	25.8

Disagreed	238	37.1	246	36.3	484	36.7
Resources in your geopolitical zone can sustain growth						
Disagreed	172	26.8	192	28.3	364	27.6
Moderately agreed	97	15.1	94	13.9	191	14.5
Strongly agreed	373	58.1	392	57.8	765	58.0

Source: *Researcher Field Survey, 2021*

Table 1.2: Respondents' Classification of Agitation

Variables	South-East		South- South		Total	
	Freq= 642	Percent =100%	Freq= 678	Percent =100%	Fre= 1320	Percent =100%
Classification one:						
Control of the resources in your geopolitical zone by federal government trigger conflict						
Strongly agreed	189	29.4	203	29.9	392	29.7
Moderately agreed	237	36.9	251	37.0	488	37.0
Disagreed	216	33.6	224	33.0	440	33.3
Classification two:						
Rate federal government commitment to enhance rapid growth of your geopolitical zone						
Low	450	70.1	475	70.1	925	70.1
moderate	119	18.5	120	17.7	239	18.1
High	73	11.4	83	12.2	156	11.8
Agitation of your geopolitical zone is morally justified						
Disagreed	240	37.4	260	38.3	500	37.9
Moderately agreed	79	12.3	81	11.9	160	12.1
Strongly agreed	323	50.3	337	49.7	660	50.0
Describe socio economic growth of your geopolitical zone in the fourth republic						
Poor						
Fair	323	50.3	340	50.1	663	50.2
Good	212	33.0	222	32.7	434	32.9

	107	16.7	116	17.1	223	16.9
The agitation of your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession						
Strongly agreed	184	28.7	195	28.8	379	28.7
Moderately agreed	181	28.2	191	28.2	372	28.2
Disagreed	277	43.1	292	43.1	569	43.1

Source: *Researcher Field Survey, 2021*

Respondents in the survey were asked to identify factors in the Nigeria government that have persistently agitated and bothered sense of belongingness in the geopolitical zones. Notably, pattern of federal appointments (15.9%), location of federal projects (2.0%), content of the 1999 constitution (5.95%), marginalization of gains of citizenry (7.2%) and resource control (69.0%) repeatedly agitated the mind. The survey showed that 61.8% strongly agreed that the agitations listed were collective struggle of the marginalized ethnic groups. Respondents pointedly identified problems with the constitution and this consisted of structure (36.7%), powers and boundary of the president (6.0%), resource control (43.5%) and formulation (13.8). Sixty-eight percent of respondents in the survey strongly agreed that the current presidential system of government is a deprivation for some ethnic groups. Cross checking the variation of the survey in south-south and south-east, 67.1% and 69.0% respectively identified resource control as major agitation of the zones; 61.8% and 61.7% strongly agreed that the agitation of the zones is collective struggle among of members of ethnics; and 68.3% & 68.2% also showed that the presidential system is source of suspicion and deprivation. Apparently, survey in the two zones, south-south (42.6%) and south-east (44.4%) notably identified resource control as major problem with current configuration of Nigeria.

In the meantime, the interview session with interviewees also offered some leeway to understand the pattern of agitation in the Nigerian federalism. A fifty-six year old Judge of the High Court was dispassionate in his comments:

> The zone is championing for resource control, equitable distribution of power and true federating units. The tenet of the constitution should truly be implemented which states that all federating units are equal. Like what we have today is a negation of the constitution especially federal appointments. Appointments by federal government tilted obviously to a section of the country, the northern extraction. There won't be peace. Let the country separate. Let the zones be independent and go their way. (IDIs/High Court Judge/South South//20201

In similar case of theme, another interviewee commented:

> There is no trust between the north and east. The north fear that leadership of the country by Igbo will lead to domination of the north. There is fear of domination. MASSOB and IPOB agitate for equity and redistribution of infrastructure in the Nigeria state (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2021).

There were twenty-five interviewees that willingly participated in this study and majority of the comments were emphasis of resource control, federal appointment, location of federal projects, marginalization of southerngeopoliticalzone and lack of trust especially between the north, and east and southgeopoliticalzones. There appears to be no respite in sight by virtue of determination of peoples of the eastern and south zones to force renegotiation of government. Obviously, respondents (58.4%) disagreed that the paltry federal projects in the zones were sustainable. Fifty-nine percent also disagreed that available federal projects in the zones could promote sense of belonging. A further probe in the survey showed that political marginalization (13.0%), economic marginalization (14.8%), inequity in local government creation (3.0%) and marginalization in military hierarchy (69.2%) were

notable forms of deprivation that south-east and south-east zones have consistently suffered in the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria. This current finding is consistent with the position of Nwabueze (2018), Nweke (2017a) and Bbalola (2019) which identified the skewed federalism in Nigeria state and disaffection off citizens. Respondents therefore strongly agreed (37.5%) or moderately agreed (25.8%) that the marginalization is recipe of large scale conflict. Results in south-south and south-east showed (57.8% and 59.0%) or (60.5% and 59.3%) respectively disagreed that paltry federal projects in the zones were sustainable and as such promotes sense of belonging.

Survey showed that 58.0% strongly agreed that available resources in the zones were sufficient to sustain growth where constitution allows autonomous resource control; whereas in Table 1.2, 37.0% moderately agreed and 29.7% strongly agreed that federal control of resources in geopolitical zones breed suspicions and clash of trust or otherwise conflict. Against this backdrop, 70.1% in the survey rated low federal government sincerity and commitment to enhance rapid growth for geopolitical zones. The suspicion that federal government is not sincere to promote growth for all triggered opinion by 50.0% of the respondents that agitation of the south-east and south-south zone is morally justified. Here, respondents rated poor (50.2%), fair (32.9%); and good (16.9%) good the socio economic transformation of the zones since the inception of the fourth republic of the presidential and federal system. Largely, 50.1 and 50.3% in south-south and south east respectively rated growth as poor; 70.1% in both east and south rated low federal government commitment to promote growth for geopolitical zones; and 49.7% & 50.3% respectively in study locations morally justified the current agitation due to flaws and effects on economic growth.

In the thematic area of interview which focused on justification for the agitation, interviewees yielded comments that were crucial for discussion. A high Court Judge who participated in the study offered useful comments:

> …major part of federal revenue comes from oil. The community that produced the oil suffered from major degradation. These communities are only offered 13% derivation which is very meager. Before the war, revenue was shared according to derivation. Majority of revenue went to areas that contributed largely to the revenue. Now the federal government takes the lion share. The communities that produced the oil and contributed largely to the revenue suffer degradation… Appointments to key and strategic positions are held by people of the north. The Igbo contributes to oil exploration…. But the zone is openly excluded… managers of Nigeria oil company are from the north. The Board of NNPC is largely dominated by people of the north. The south east is deprived and excluded (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2021)

Another interviewee commented:

> The effect of oil exploration in the niger delta is overwhelming. Construction of one kilometre road in the zone cost not less than one billion naira or more. But in other zones, the amount is much less due to topography. Oil exploration has degraded the environment. We are championing for resource control to develop our zone. The federal government is depriving us. We are suffering for it. We experience pollution, gas flaring, oil spillage and environmental degradation. We are the people in midst of the danger. They don't understand our pains. Resources should be distributed according to source where it is coming from. Let people benefit fairly from their God given resources (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2021).

The domain of comments and responses from the interviewees was exposition of maltreatment meted to geopolitical zones of the south-south and south-east. There was concerted ideological unification of views that the current federal system hampered growth for some units and promoted growth other units. The pattern of agitation therefore is the reconciliation route of resource control which is likely to douse the current tension and suspicions. Indeed, some respondents (28.7%) and 28.2% strongly agreed and moderately agreed to option of secession, although interviewees opted for peaceful renegotiation of agreement for collective Nigeria.

Table 2: Cross Tabulation

How would you rate your perception of fair representation of your ethnic group in federal civil service? *Do you believe in the unity of Nigeria?

Cross tabulation

Count

		I believe in the unity of Nigeria			Total
		Disagreed	Moderately agreed	Strongly agreed	
Rate your perception of fair representation of your ethnic group in federal appointments	Poor	488	242	132	862
	Fair	130	133	0	263
	Good	117	39	39	195
Total		735	414	171	1320

The cross tabulation in the above table shows more than half of the respondents (862) rated as poor representation of geopolitical ethnic groups in federal appointments. In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to give their perception on appointments in federal service covered core civil service, police, military (army, navy and air force) and paramilitary. Also more than half (735) disagreed that Nigeria government promotes unity in the federal system that operates unfair representation in federal appointments.

Table 2.1: Chi Square

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	89.814[a]	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	119.077	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.135	1	.714
N of Valid Cases	1320		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.26.

The chi square of relationship between variables items is significant given the value x^2 89.8; $p<0.005$. Indicatively, a federal system like the case of Nigeria that promotes lopsided appointments in federal industries and bureaucracies will possibly jeopardize unity among the federating units.

Table 2.2: Correlation

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	-.010	.029	-.367	.714[c]
Ordinal by Ordinal	Spearman Correlation	-.007	.028	-.237	.813[c]
N of Valid Cases		1320			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

At the level of correlation, Pearson's value is negative (r-0.01) and there is no significance (0.0714). Neither Spearman correlation is positively related or significant. Constructing explanation for this analysis, it will be stated

that appointments by federal government are not completely skewed on the ground of constitutionality. The 1999 constitution consciously states that there shall be minister of the federal republic of Nigeria which shall be appointed, selected or elected as appropriate from each federating state. The federal government judiciously observes this provision, although type of ministerial portfolio may differ by virtue of status and relevance.

Conclusion

There is curious assertion to state that federalism is skewed when it is considered in the space of southern peoples as evidently showed. There is asymmetric pattern in the structure of benefits accorded and this formed the basis of disgruntled voices in the space of Nigerian federalism. Originally, federalism offers choice of consent and bargaining in the agreement to give up self govern regional ethnics of the south and north of Nigeria. The consent is laid down to accept federal state and belong to one Nigeria. This consent is reinforced around recognition of multilateral interest. The bargaining power also derives from agreement to redistribute federal resources according to contribution and entrenchment of principle and ethics of the contract. This offers foundation for sustainable federal state which guarantees the continuity. Government that short-change such agreement becomes tainted with suspicion especially around multi ethnic groups. Unfortunately, the trend that beclouds government of President Muhammadu Buhari is second to none shaping public opinion of sentiment and ethnic uprising in the east and south zones of Nigeria. Against this backdrop this study recommends the following.

1. Forms of agitations listed by peoples of the east and south in the study were mainly resource control. Although the 1999 constitution makes provision for oil derivation benefits to peoples of the east and south, there was disproportionate expression of dissatisfaction against this provision. The agitation was demonstrated as potential for discord of unity and possible cessation. Against this background, the study recommends renegotiation of oil derivation benefits which justifies consent of the host communities of mineral resources. Here, bottom-top approach should be adopted in the renegotiation.

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