

POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION AND POLITICS OF ROTATIONAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

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Abstract

This paper examined the phenomenon of political marginalization and politics of the rotational system in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The concept of marginalization in relation to politics has been widely studied in both the literature and empirical studies. The study was guided by three objectives and three research questions. John Rawls's theory of justice which emphasises on procedural method of distributing political rights and economic benefits was adopted. Descriptive quantitative survey was used for the study while one (1) Senatorial zone each was chosen – from Kwara and Kaduna States for the population of the study. Probability proportionate cluster sampling technique were used in distributing the questionnaire two hundred and fifty (250) research participants were sampled. Data were collected using both primary and secondary sources. The instrument for data collection were validated by team of supervisors and experts in Language and Statistics for content, face and construct validity. The reliability of the instrument was conducted through the use of Cronbach Alpha with the help of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20.0. data collected from respondents were analyzed by the descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The findings of the study revealed that: the political marginalization has not significantly motivated the politics of rotational system in Nigeria. Also, there are unequal distribution of public resources and economic benefits across the selected zones compared to the advantaged zones in Kwara and Kaduna States respectively. And that, population has no significant impact on the rotational system in Nigeria's Fourth (4th) Republic. The study made the following recommendation among others: Government at all levels should promote a comprehensive democratic culture with all its intricacies that can take Nigeria closer to the emergence of stable, meaningful, purposeful and beneficial polity. And also, No ethnic group in the country should be marginalized as political position should not be the monopoly of one section.

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Introduction

The origin of rotational system is very much unknown; it can be described to be as old as man's existence in the universe. Records show that the system of rotation was practiced by the Greeks and the ancient Roman Empire. The European Union and Switzerland, also practice a rotational system of government (Okwenna, 2017). The presidency of the European Union rotates among the member states while it rotates among the various ethnic groups in Switzerland. Switzerland and the European Union are among the most stable country and institution in the world.

In Nigeria, marginalization is the order of the day; particularly fourth republic because Nigeria is a deeply divided society with several lines of social divisions on the bases of group identification. These lines of division, as noted by Orji (2008, p. 10 cited in Orji, 2018), in his work "Power Sharing the Element of Continuity in Nigerian Politics", reflects on the number of ethnic and regional groups that make up the country. This population disparity coupled with the differences in the political influence of the ethnic groups broadly divides the groups into two - the majority and minority ethnic groups. The majority ethnic groups are the Hausa and Fulani (28% of the population), the Yoruba (18% of the population) and Igbo (16% of the population). All the other ethnic groups fit in to the minority category, with varying degrees of political status, depending on their numerical size and political influence (Danjibo, 2019). On this basis, Obinna and Veronica (2022) supported the prevalence of politics of marginalization in Nigeria when they asserted that:

The Nigerian political trajectory has been characterized with the utilization of state powers in appropriating resources and offices in a manner that put some ethnic nationalities at a disadvantaged position thereby making the politics of marginalization an important political question in the Nigerian political system (p. 51). The point being made therefore, is that the politics of marginalization is entrenched in the Nigerian political system and such tendency has the capacity to destabilize the state and sap it of development. Needless to say that the Nigerian state consists of the majority ethnic groups viz Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo and a host of other minorities. The minority ethnic groups from the oil resource areas in the South have been agitating for more emphasis to be given to derivation in the sharing of federal allocations. Agbese (2013) writes that minority rights advocates have employed the concepts of internal colonialism to help explain the plight of minorities in Nigeria as the essence of internal colonialism according to Ben Naanen runs as follows: Majority ethnic groups acquire power on the basis of their number of superiority. They use the political power to transfer resources from territories of ethnic minorities to their own areas. Thus, economically advantaged core areas of Nigeria emerge in territories largely populated by ethnic majority. Conversely, the removal of resources from minority areas create a periphery of economically advantaged territories. Political power in the hands of majorities translates to economic power, which in turn is used to simultaneously develop ethnic majority territories. At the same time, the same political power is used to seize the economic development of minority territories (p. 246-247).

The term rotational presidency has become a very important political concept and cliché which has crept into African countries (Nigeria inclusive). The idea of rotational Presidency started in Nigeria during the 1995 National Constitutional Conference under the regime of former Nigerian Maximum ruler, late President Sani Abacha. Six geo-political zones were

adopted during the conference and the National Political Offices will be filled by candidates on a rotational basis based on the six geo-political zones with a transitional provision of 30 years. It was agreed that the rotational system was to be entrenched in the then Draft Constitution and will be applied to all spheres of government (Njoku, 2014). The six geo-political zones which includes the North East, North West and North Central in the northern part of the country and the South East, South West and South South in the southern part of the country was introduced as a remedy to the issue of marginalization in Nigeria. It was assumed that the six geo-political zones will bring to an end the issue of monopoly of power by the north. The northern part of the country had dominated the leadership of Nigeria, and they use this position to secure juicy political privileges for their own people at the detriment of the people from the south of the country. This sad experience was climaxed in the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election (Idowu, 2014); the election was won by late MoshoodAbiola, a southerner.

The 1999 general election, President OlusegunObasanjo contested under the auspices of the People's Democratic Party and OluFalaie vied for All Nigerian Peoples Party, thus, two South Westerners contested the presidential slot. The lacuna in the rotational principle was felt immediately after the expiration of President OlusegunObasanjo's four years' term, he initiated plans for a second term in office, which was not mentioned in the agreement on rotational Presidency, this generated a lot of controversy. The Northerners insisted that power was going to return to them while the Southerners maintained on retaining power for another four years, so that power will then move to the North for eight uninterrupted years. The National Executive Committee of Peoples Democratic Party held a meeting and votes were cast in favour of the South and power continued in the South with an understanding that after President OlusegunObasanjo's tenure, power should return to the North for eight continuous years (Clerke, 2018). At the expiration of President OlusegunObasanjo's regime of eight years saw the emergence of AlahajiUmoru Musa Yaradua from the North, the power was however truncated with the sudden death of AlahajiUmoru Musa Yar'Adua in 2010. It is against this background that the study assessed political marginalization and politics of rotational system in Nigeria's Fourth (4th) Republic.

Statement of the Problem

It has been observed that not many scholars subscribe to the adoption of rotational presidency in Nigeria. Some oppose it on ideological basis while others do so, on other grounds. Indeed, there is no denying in the fact that the notion of rotational system has the potential of doing more harm than good to the polity by further complicating the search for good governance, national integration and democracy. This is because the operators of the concept are those characters that have been participating in the Nigeria enterprise right from her inception as an independent state or even beyond. They have participated actively in the running and ruining of Nigeria enterprise.

Several names are used in place of rotational system. However, no matter the name it is called parliamentary, presidential, French indicative, rotational presidency, power shift, power sharing, democracy, military, democrat in uniform etc. there could be no improved changes in the lives of great number of the masses who are the majority. And this exactly is what is happening in Nigeria today despite power shift from North (Musa Yar'adua) to South (Goodluck Jonathan) and to the north (Muhammad Buhari). Even the situation looks worse.

This is because the production method has not changed. It remains that of primitive accumulation with wide spread poverty and corruption in the land. With rotational presidency, Nigeria is the 3rd most corrupt nation of the world and over 70% of her population is below poverty line:

The notion of power sharing (shift) then becomes an ideology, an exercise in false consciousness meant to create a feeling of power dispersal in the face of power concentration. A feeling of symmetry even as the formation and perpetuation of asymmetrical relations between people, groups, institution in which one partner in the relationship dominates or exploits the other continues (Human and Zaiman, 2015, p. 40).

Needless to state here that by virtue of their long occupation of the seat of power (both in military and democratic regimes), Kwara Central elites and elites of Northern part of Kaduna State developed an affinity for state power and thus perceived it as their birthright which have begun to negate the adoption of rotational system. To the extent that the Kwara Central elites and elites of Northern part of Kaduna State viewed the Deputy Governorship position “Kisira and Governorship to Yakwa” as loan to the marginalized groups to compensate and assuage anxieties that usually emerge over electoral debacle.

Going back to history, the 1994–1995 Constitutional Conference clearly demonstrated an understanding of Nigeria’s political problems when it consensually resolved that the presidency should rotate between the North and South, which was dutifully included in Section 229 (1–5) of its draft constitution (Nwala, 1997; Agbaje, 1998). Yet the 1999 constitution, which was supposedly a product of that Conference, did not contain these provisions. Nevertheless, the spirit of power rotation guided the post-military transition that produced the Obasanjo presidency in 1999. The impetus for zoning and rotation of power was ostensibly derived from efforts to create a sense of belonging amongst ethno-national elite groups in the face of the inadequacies of federal character principles. AperAku argued that, “Zoning can rescue minorities from political obscurity and at the same time guarantee majority interests, foster national stability and ensure the success [of democracy] (Onwudiwe, 2014, p. 273).” The strong questions now are: Has zoning and rotational system rescued minorities from political obscurity in the country? Has it guaranteed majority interests? Has it foster national stability and ensure the success [of democracy]? The answer to this can be seen from the loud echoing of the masses over bad governance and the marginalization of minority (south-south and south-east) by the northern Nigeria.

It is necessary at this point to clarify the concepts of zoning and rotation. These concepts are mutually reinforcing. There cannot be rotation unless the issue of zoning is resolved. Constitutionally, zones do not properly exist in the Nigerian polity. Such categorizations as North, South, and other geopolitical zones are fluid and arbitrary terms used in political discourse and are designed merely to serve as guides to confer meaning and boundary. Because there is no constitutional basis for a zone structure. The absence of an authoritative constitutional beacon as a guide for what constitutes Nigerian political zones does not invalidate their usefulness as essential categories. It only makes it impossible, indeed unproductive, to sustain an argument about the trajectory and rotation of power. The only official document that makes any reference to zones and zoning outside Abacha’s summarization of the outcome of the 1994–1995 Constitutional Conference, presented in his

1995 Independence Day national broadcast, is the PDP constitution (Nwala, 1997, p. 201–203). The PDP constitution provides that:

In pursuance of the principle of zoning, justice and fairness, the party shall adhere to the policy of rotation and zoning of party and public elective offices and it shall be enforced by the appropriate executive committee at all levels. (Section 7 (2), Constitution of the People's Democratic Party, 1998).

The most important determining variable in national disaggregation is ethnicity. Because of the permeation of ethnicity into every sector and stratum of social and political discourse, it has become the primary basis for the distribution of state wealth. This has led to political marginalization and injustice in the distribution of States' wealth and economic benefits that has in consequence hindered the rotational system in Nigeria. It is against these stated problems that the study assessed political marginalization and politics of rotational system in Nigeria's Fourth (4th) Republic.

Research Questions

From the stated problems, this study therefore, is guided by the following specific research questions:

- a. To what extent does the level of political marginalization motivate the politics of rotational system in Nigeria?
- b. What has been the degree of injustice in the process of resource distribution across the regions in Nigeria's Fourth republic?
- c. What is the impact of population on the rotational system in Nigeria's Fourth (4th) Republic?

Method of Data Analysis

Since the study depended on questionnaire techniques of data collection, a quantitative technique was equally used for data analysis. Quantitative data collected from respondents was analyzed by the descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The descriptive statistics is the use of tables to assess the respondent's views; while inferential statistics is the use of statistical method that enabled logical inferences arrived. The inferential statistical method appropriate for the study is chi-square. The rationale behind the choice of chi-square lies on the fact that it is disjointed hypotheses (Cresswell, 2009, p. 144). This was done with the help of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25.

Data Presentation and Analysis

A total of one-hundred and fifty-two (152) copies of questionnaire were administered to the respondents. Though, one-hundred and fifty-two (152) questionnaires were printed and distributed, but one-hundred and thirty seven 137 questionnaire representing 90.1 approximately 91% of the total questionnaire were duly filled and returned, while 15 questionnaire representing 9.1% of the total questionnaire were not returned. Therefore, 137 questionnaires formed the basis for analysis and interpretation

4.1 Descriptive Analysis

Table 4.1 Respondents Rate

	Items	States		Number	%
1	Number of Samples	Kwara	92	152	
		Kaduna	60		
2	Number of Returned and Dully Filled	Kwara	82	137	90.1%
		Kaduna	55		
3	Number of Returned but wrongly filled	Kwara	3	5	3.3%
		Kaduna	2		
4	Number of unreached respondents	Kwara	7	10	6.6%
		Kaduna	3		
Total			152		100%

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

A total number of One Hundred and Fifty Two questionnaires were administered, a total number of ten (10) respondents could not be reached while five (5) of the respondents were returned but wrongly filled.

1.2 Bio Data of the Respondents

Sex	States		Frequency	Percentage
Male	Kwara	45	84	61.3%
	Kaduna	39		
Female	Kwara	37	53	38.7
	Kaduna	16		
Total			137	100%
Age	States		Frequency	Percentage
Below 30	Kwara	13	20	14.6%
	Kaduna	7		
31-45	Kwara	39	70	51.1%
	Kaduna	31		
46 and above	Kwara	30	47	34.3%
	Kaduna	17		
Total			137	100%

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024.

As earlier presented one hundred and fifty two questionnaires were distributed, one hundred and forty two (142) were retrieved but only one hundred and thirty seven (137) questionnaires were dully filled without any errors.

The above table indicated that there is an overwhelming preponderance of male respondents in both Kwara and Kaduna states. The table shows sixty one point three percent (61.3%) of

males both in Kwara and Osun states while thirty eight point seven percent (38.7%) for females both in Kwara and Kaduna states.

It is equally indicated on the table, the age group of the respondents the figures indicates that individual below thirty (30) years widely represented with a response of fourteen point six percent (14.6%) both in Kwara and Kaduna States. An individual between the age of 31- 45 years constitute most of the response in this survey with fifty one point one (51.1%) both in Kwara and Osun states while thirty four point three percent (44.3%) represent individual between the age of 46 years and above.

1.3 Questions relating to Political Marginalization in Kwara and Kaduna States, Nigeria

	Statement	States	SA	A	U	D	SD	Total	Remarks
	Political marginalization influence the effectiveness of the rotational system in ensuring equitable representation	Kwara	12 (14.6%)	41 (50%)	8 (9.8%)	14 (17.1%)	7 (8.5%)	82 (100%)	Agreed
		Kaduna	12 (21.8%)	11 (20%)	5 (9.1%)	14 (25.5%)	13 (23.6%)	55 (100%)	Disagreed
	Does political marginalization affect the legitimacy and acceptance of leaders selected through the rotational system.	Kwara	17 (20.8%)	29 (35.4%)	3 (3.7%)	18 (21.9%)	15 (18.2%)	82 (100%)	Agreed
		Kaduna	15 (27.3%)	19 (34.5%)	5 (9.1%)	11 (20%)	5 (9.1%)	55 (100%)	Agreed
	Does political marginalization contribute to challenges in implementing and maintaining the rotational system in Nigeria's fourth republic	Kwara	33 (40.2%)	27 (32.9%)	3 (3.7%)	11 (13.4%)	8 (9.8%)	82 (100%)	Strongly Agreed
		Kaduna	17 (30.9%)	25 (45.5%)	3 (5.5%)	6 (10.9%)	4 (7.2%)	55 (100%)	Agreed
	Political marginalization impacts the political participation and engagement of marginalized groups within the rotational system	Kwara	15 (18.3%)	17 (20.7%)	6 (7.3%)	29 (35.4%)	15 (18.3%)	82 (100%)	Disagreed
		Kaduna	11 (20%)	13 (23.6%)	2 (3.6%)	10 (18.2%)	19 (34.6%)	55 (100%)	Strongly Disagreed
	Does political marginalization influence the transparency and accountability of	Kwara	13 (23.6%)	4 (7.3%)	1 (1.8%)	23 (41.8%)	14 (25.5%)	82 (100%)	Disagreed
		Kaduna	13	14	1	23	4	55	Disagreed

	the rotational system	a	(23.6 %)	(25.5%)	(1.8%)	(41.8%)	(7.3%)		eed
	Political marginalization result in unequal distribution of resources and opportunities within the rotational system	Kwara	34 (41.5 %)	23 (28.0%)	2 (2.4%)	13 (15.9%)	10 (12.2%)	82 (100%)	Strongl y Agreed
		Kadun a	27 (49.1 %)	9 (16.4%)	3 (5.4%)	7 (12.7%)	9 (16.4%)	55 (100%)	Strongl y Agreed
	Political marginalization result affect the confidence and trust of the electorate in the rotational system	Kwara	21 (25.6 %)	29 (35.4%)	1 (1.2%)	17 (20.7%)	14 (17.1%)	82 (100%)	Agreed
		Kadun a	22 (40%)	16 (29.1%)	5 (9.1%)	9 (16.4%)	3 (5.4%)	55 (100%)	Agreed
	Does political marginalization impact the inclusivity and representation	Kwara	11 (13.4 %)	35 (42.6%)	4 (4.9%)	19 (23.2%)	13 (15.9%)	82 (100%)	Strongl y Disagr eed
		Kadun a	7 (12.7 %)	9 (16.4%)	3 (5.4%)	21 (38.2%)	15 (27.3%)	55 (100%)	Disagr eed
	Political marginalization contribute to political instability or conflict related to the rotational system	Kwara	33 (40.2 %)	29 (35.4%)	1 (1.2%)	6 (7.3%)	13 (15.9%)	82 (100%)	Strongl y Agreed
		Kadun a	11 (20%)	7 (12.7%)	0 (0%)	12 (21.8%)	25 (45.5%)	55 (100%)	Disagr eed
	Addressing political marginalization potential improve the functionality and acceptance of the rotational system in Nigeria's fourth republic	Kwara	34 (41.5 %)	17 (20.7%)	3 (3.7%)	15 (18.3%)	13 (15.8%)	82 (100%)	Strongl y Agreed
		Kadun a	13 (23.6 %)	7 (12.7%)	3 (5.5%)	27 (49.1%)	5 (9.1%)	55 (100%)	Disagr eed
TOTAL		Kwara							
		Kadun a							

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024.

The above table 4.4 shows that the respondents in the both states Kwara and Kaduna states in the first statement: *Political marginalization influence the effectiveness of the rotational system in ensuring equitable representation*, that 14.6% and 50% strongly agreed and agreed with accumulative percent **64.6%** but 14% and 8.5% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the accumulative percent 22.5% in Kwara state which shows that political marginalization influence the effectiveness of the rotational system in ensuring equitable representation in Kwara state while in Kaduna 21.8% and 23.6% strongly agree and agreed with the

accumulative percent 45.4% while 25.5% and 20% disagreed and strongly disagree on the statement respectively with the accumulative 45.5% of the respondents in Kaduna State.

In response to the precipitates of such marginalisation include deprivation and exclusion of some ethnic groups from decision making. These contestations, according to [Labinjo \(2007\)](#) and [Adebayo \(2016\)](#) have always been due to the propensity of certain ethnic and geographical parts of the country wanting to hold on to political power in ways that undermine the political aspirations of other groups. These feelings have historical antecedents.

It was divulge in the cause of research that political marginalization was never a problem in Kwara state but it was a great obstacle to effectiveness to rotational system in Kaduna state. In response to second statement *Does political marginalization affect the legitimacy and acceptance of leaders selected through the rotational system*, respondents in both Kwara State and Kaduna State unanimously agreed to the statement. However, 20.8% and 35.4% strongly agreed and agreed in Kwara state with the accumulative 56.2% percent but 21.8% and 18.2% of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed with the accumulative percent 40.1% while 27.3% and 34.5% strongly agreed and agreed to the statement in Kaduna state with the accumulative percent 61.8% of the respondents but 20% and 9.1% of the respondents with the accumulative percent 29.1% of the respondents in Kaduna state

This is a particularly acute problem in third world countries, where women's participation in political affairs is mostly linked with the dominant, male-oriented social cultural and religious environment. This kind of marginalization is also felt by ethnic minorities, migrants, disabled persons, elderly, etc. (Verba, 2015).

The crux of elite theory is that power in the society is vested in a minority who attain such a position through possession of wealth, force, or intellect ([Higley, 2010](#)). Elites sustain their dominance through replacing themselves, by 'empowering' non-elites into the elitist position, crossing from one elite group to another ([López, 2013](#))

It was deduce in the above discussion that political marginalization hinder the legitimacy and acceptance of leader through the rotational system in both Kwara State and Kaduna State respectively.

In response to third statement *does political marginalization contribute to challenges in implementing and maintaining the rotational system in Nigeria's fourth republic*, respondents with 40.2% and 32.9% with the accumulative percent 73.1% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed in Kwara state but 13.4% and 9.8% with the accumulative percent 23.2% disagree and strongly disagreed while 45.5% and 30.9% with the accumulative percent 76.4% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed but 10.9% and 7.2% with the accumulative percent 18.1% of them disagreed and strongly disagreed the statement.

If the agreement on rotating power is respected by stakeholders, it promotes belonging and stability. Groups, especially the minority, will not feel excluded or threatened. It prevents ethnic domination. [Osaghae \(1999\)](#) posits that ethnic domination whittles unity. Minority groups will see themselves as major stakeholders in the country despite their minority status,

which is majorly due to their low population compared to majority ethnic and religious groups.

In view of the above assertion, it was observed that political marginalization affect the effective implementation and maintaining rotational system in Nigeria fourth republic in both Kwara state and Kaduna state.

More so, the fourth statement envisage that *Political marginalization impacts the political participation and engagement of marginalized groups within the rotational system*, the result revealed that 18.3% and 20.7% given accumulative percent of 39% of respondents strongly agree and agree that political marginalization impacts the political participation and engagement of marginalized group within the rotational system but 35.4% and 18.3% with the accumulative percent of **53.7%** of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagree the statement in Kwara state while 20% and 23.6% with the accumulative percent 43.6% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed the statement in Kaduna State while 18.2% and 34.6% of the respondent with the accumulative percent **52.8%** disagreed and strongly disagreed to the statement in Kaduna State. Based on the response in this table, one may come to a conclusion that political marginalization has no impact on the political participation and engagement marginalized groups within the rotational system.

Statement presents and analyze the data collected with respect to *Does political marginalization influence the transparency and accountability of the rotational system*, The result revealed that 20.7% and 9.8% with the accumulative percent 30.5% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed the statement while 46.3% and 18.3% with the accumulative percent **64.6%** of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed the statement in Kwara state while 23.6% and 7.3% with the accumulative percent 30.9% strongly agreed and agreed the statement in Kaduna State while 41.8% and 25.5% with the accumulative percent **67.3%** of the respondents disagree and strongly disagreed the statement in Kaduna State. Based on the response in this table, one may come to a conclusion that political marginalization has no influence on the transparency and accountability of the rotational system in both Kwara and Kaduna State.

Statement six presents and analyse the data collected with respect to *Political marginalization result in unequal distribution of resources and opportunities within the rotational system*. It depicts that 41.5% and 28.0% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed the statement with the accumulative percent **69.5%** in Kwara state, 15.9 and 12.2% of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed with the accumulative percent **30.5%** in Kwara state, while 49.1% and 16.4% of the respondents are within strongly agreed and agreed with the accumulative percent **65.5%** in Kaduna State but 12.7% and 16.4% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree the statement with the accumulative percent 29.1%. Judging from the frequency distribution table above, the highest frequency is **69.5%** in Kwara state and **65.5%** in Kaduna State, this translate to mean that majority of the respondents posited that political marginalization result in unequal distribution of resources and opportunities within the rotational system in both Kwara state and Kaduna state.

Statement seven depicts the analysis of data collected with respect to *Political marginalization result affect the confidence and trust of the electorate in the rotational*

system. It shows that 35.4% and 25.6% of the respondents with the accumulative percent **61%** are from Kwara State and 40% and 29.1% of the respondents with the accumulative percent **69.1%** are from Kaduna State strongly agreed and agreed the statement. This translates to mean that majority of the respondents from both Kwara and Kaduna States affirmed that political marginalization result affects the confidence and trust of the electorate in the rotational system in Nigeria.

Statement eight presents and analyse the data collected with respect to whether Kwara-North and Kaduna-South zones being political marginalization has impact in their inclusivity and representation. The result revealed that 13.4% and 42.6% given accumulative percent of 56% of respondents strongly agree and agree that Kwara state and Kaduna state being sidelined in political sphere; 38.2% of the respondents and 27.3% given a cumulative percent of 65.5% of the respondents strongly disagree and disagree respectively. Based on the response in this table, one may come to a conclusion that Kwara state political marginalization has impact on the inclusivity and representation and Kaduna-South zones being sidelined in political sphere. Statement nine presents and analyse the data collected with respect to whether political marginalization contribute to political instability or conflict related to the rotational system. The result revealed that 40.2% and 35.4% given accumulative percent of **75.6%** of respondents strongly agree and agree that Kwara state and Kaduna state being relegated by political instability or conflict related to the rotational system; 12 respondents representing 21.8% and 25 respondents representing 45.5% given a cumulative percent of 67.3% of the respondents strongly disagree and disagree respectively. Based on the response in this table, one may come to a conclusion that Kwara state political marginalization contribute to political instability or conflict related to the rotational system and Kaduna-state posited that Political marginalization do not contribute to political instability or conflict related to the rotational system in Nigeria.

The last statement in the above table presents and analyse the data collected with respect to whether *addressing political marginalization potential improve the functionality and acceptance of the rotational system in Nigeria's fourth republic*. The result revealed that 41.5% and 20.6% given accumulative percent of **62.2%** of respondents strongly agree and agree the statement; 3 respondents representing 3.7% of the respondents are undecided in Kwara state while 27 respondents representing 49.1% and 5 respondents representing 9.1% given a cumulative percent of **58.2%** of the respondents strongly disagree and disagree respectively the statement in Kaduna. Based on the response in this table, one may come to a conclusion that political marginalization addressing potential improve the functionality and acceptance of the rotational system in Nigeria's fourth republic in Kwara state than Kaduna State. This means Kaduna State decline that political marginalization has not addressing potential improve the functionality of the rotational system in Kaduna state, Nigeria.

Conclusion

The study drew conclusion based on data generated from questionnaire during field work, including submissions from secondary documents. Consequently, the study has offered recommendations designed to ensure that political marginalization is reduced on one side and rotational system is effectively applied on the other. However, from the findings of this study and the discussions on the various results obtained at through questionnaire and secondary documents, the study concludes thus:

The study concludes that political marginalization has not significantly motivated the politics of rotational system in Nigeria. This is because Kwara-North and Kaduna-South zones are being sidelined and relegated in political sphere and there is domination of Kwara-Central/Kaduna-North in the political scene of the States. On objective II, the study concludes that the degree of injustice in the distribution of public resources across the selected studied zones compared to the advantaged zones in Nigeria's Fourth republic. For example, table 4.9 and 4.10 showed that there is unfairness in the; or unequal distribution of public resources and economic benefits across the selected zones compared to the advantaged zones in Kwara and Kaduna States respectively. On objective III, the study also concludes that population has no significant impact on the rotational system in Nigeria's Fourth (4th) Republic. As some parts of the selected States dominated the political scene. Table 4.11 stated it clearly that political population has impacted on the rotational system in Nigeria's Fourth (4th) Republic respectively. The argument was supported by the assertion that, Kwara-North Local Governments and Kaduna-South Local Governments respectively would have formed coalition (plus the little votes from the dominating parts) to win election if population is a determining factor

Recommendations

There is no guarantee that rotational system in Kwara and Kaduna States could automatically solve the problem of injustice, unfairness, inadequate political participation and many more that confronts other ethnic groups in the study areas. In view of the findings, the following recommendations designed to ensure that political marginalization is reduced on one side and rotational system is effectively applied on the other.

Government at all levels should promote a comprehensive democratic culture with all its intricacies that can take Nigeria closer to the emergence of stable, meaningful, purposeful and beneficial polity. If that is attained there would hardly be any need for an ideology such as power sharing or power shift. Additionally, if it is the rotational system that could bring the necessary platform for entrenching democratic culture in Nigeria with her pluralistic structure it could be adopted and entrenched in the country's constitution. So that all sections of any State will be given chances to rule.

No ethnic group in the country should be marginalized as political position is not the monopoly of one section. It should therefore be rotated between the political zones making the region or State. Every section of the country or State should be allowed to taste especially the highest office in the land (presidency or Governorship as the case may be) for equity and fairness.