Keywords
resource control
ethnic groups
federal character
How to Cite
Abstract
Nigeria federalismis a subject of debate in the public domain. There is increasing concern that undermines significance and robust value of federal system of government in the Nigeria context. It is notable universal knowledge that federalism is prototype of national developmentand economic growthfor some countries like the United States of America. Despiteevidence of positive outcome in federal states, Nigeria case is bedeviled with strives and unhealthy rivalry. There is increasing dilapidation of ethnic distrust which is hampering unity of Nigeria especially the anxiety of the south-south and south-east peoples. The problem has been exacerbated in the government of President MuhammaduBuhari. Against this backdrop, this study appraised pattern of agitationin the Nigeria federal system. The study adopted survey design which consisted of qualitative and quantitative method. Sample size was 1320 and this was applied for quantitative survey, while qualitative survey was conducted among smallsize groups. Datawere collected and analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. The former applied structured questionnaire, descriptive and inferential statistics. The latter applied unstructured interview and thematic analysis. More than three quarter, 735 participants disagreed that federal government enshrinednational unity in the structure of federal appointments. Chi square estimate,x2 89.8; p<0.01, was significant measuring pattern of federal appointments and ethnic agitations. Qualitative data reveals, Indigenous peoples of the southern Nigeria identified skewed pattern of federal appointmentsin key military hierarchy and mainstream oil corporation whichexcluded their ethnic members. This is the major cause of agitation. This study recommends renegotiation of oil derivation benefits, restructuring of appointment in key oil corporation which justifies consent of the host communities of mineral resources.
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